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CHOICE OF LAW REGARDING PRIVATE
ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE: A
SUGGESTED APPROACH
LAURENCE JAY EISENSTEIN*
Private activities in outer space are increasing rapidly. The
United States and the European Space Agency are both facilitating
the launch of privately owned objects consequently increasing the
amount of private commercial involvement in outer space. What was
formerly the exclusive province of agencies for a handful of govern-
ments is now open territory for the business world.
As such private activity increases, and as activity in space in
general increases, many legal questions will have to be answered.
For example, an American is injured on the space shuttle by a prod-
uct made in England. Two private communications satellites collide
in space. The remnants of a space object fall to earth and destroy
property. These are just a few of the many situations that could oc-
cur in the future.
In all of these areas of potential dispute, it is unclear what coun-
try's substantive law would be applied. Where the parties involved
are private persons, and no international treaties governing state lia-
bility are applicable, there are no readily available answers. This Ar-
ticle attempts to provide some answers, by suggesting choice of law
rules for private activities in outer space and tries to solve the puzzle
of whose law will be applied.
The analysis will focus, in particular, on the field of torts.' Tort
* B.A., Harvard University, 1982; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1985; Currently Judicial
Clerk for Honorable Walter E. Black, Jr. of the United States District Court for Maryland.
1. While other areas could be explored, torts seem to pose the most difficult problems
and are most immediately relevant to current outer space activities. Contractual issues are
largely earthbound, as are trusts and similar issues. See Bockstiegel, The Law Applicable to
Contracts on Space Activities, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 203 (1983) for an analysis of choice of law for contract issues in outer space.
While contracts or trusts may implicate outer space activities, the nature of the dispute would
seem to be primarily earthbound, and so best be governed by existing international choice of
law considerations. A contract to supply a part for a space object, for example, seems to pose
no problems other than those associated with supplying a part for a car or airplane.
Other issues seem too futuristic to treat at this stage. In particular the author would defer
consideration of property issues, such as who owns minerals mined from a celestial body. Such
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law has always been a subject of much conflict of laws discussion.
There are numerous State interests involved in a tort case, including
the interests of the State of the injured party, of the defendant, and of
the place of injury. Reconciling these interests has been difficult,
even for earthbound torts.
Choice of law thinking was historically based upon the use of
"connecting factors," elements which would give a simple rule to
lead to application of one nation's law. This could be the domicile of
a party for succession rights in movable property, or the place of
contracting for a contract issue.2 In tort law the connecting factor
used was the place of injury. Under the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws in the United States, any tort dispute would be decided by use
of the law of the place of injury.' Use of such a rule has some advan-
tages, including simplicity and predictability of cases.
While this approach achieves the desirable goal of simplicity, it
may at times sacrifice justice in the individual case. For example, if a
United States citizen is injured while in a car with another United
States citizen on a daytrip to Canada, it would seem most logical to
apply United States law to govern the liability of the driver to the
passenger. The traditional rule, however, would use Canadian law
since Canada is the lex locus delicti. Courts have recognized this
problem and over time used various "tricks" to avoid application of
the law of the place of injury. A tort case might be characterized as a
contract case, such as if the accident involved a rental car, thus al-
lowing use of the law of the place of contracting, not the place of
injury.4
Another device used is renvoi, meaning that a reference to the
law of a State is a reference to the whole law of that State, including
the choice of law rules. Thus the State whose laws were used could
refer to the substantive rule of another jurisdiction. Traditionally,
renvoi was disfavored in the United States, and has been disfavored in
general except for issues of title to land and validity of divorce de-
issues, while they may be important later, are not of imminent concern, and the issues them-
selves are not yet clearly defined.
2. Use of a single connecting factor led to the labeling of this as a single aspect method.
See, E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 56-58 (1982) for a discussion of these and other
connecting factors.
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934); Alabama Great S.
R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
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crees.5 Nevertheless, it is an important means to put flexibility into a
single aspect method.
The next development in the United States, in reaction to the
rigidity of the Restatement, was the development of an approach that
looks more to state interests and the "most significant contacts" to
the issue in dispute. This multi-aspect method was the approach
adopted in the United States in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws 6 and the famous case of Babcock v. Jackson.' This approach
sacrifices simplicity and predictability in favor of balancing the con-
tacts to reflect justice in a specific case. In the above example, United
States law would be applied to the Americans traveling in Canada
since the United States has closer contacts to the issue of guest-host
negligence. Each issue in the case is analyzed separately in order to
determine which state has the closest connection to that issue.8
In looking at a state's contacts to an issue, and interests in ap-
plying its substantive law, several jurisdictions in the United States
have gone one step further. They not only look to the interests of
each individual state, but also to multistate or multinational concerns
to see whose law should be applicable. Decisions in California9 and
Rhode Island"° reflect this trend, which has been termed interest, or
functional analysis." Such an analysis might note, for example, that
in a contract dispute there is an expectation of the parties that they
are executing a valid contract, and so it should be presumed that the
parties intended the applicable law be that which validates their con-
tract. Multistate concerns include analysis of trends in the law, ex-
pectations of parties, and generally accepted policy norms.' 2
In summary, choice of law rules in the United States have in-
5. For an American case using renvoi see In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96
N.Y.S.2d 652 (1950) (concerning title to land).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971).
7. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
8. Indeed these were the facts of Babcock v. Jackson.
9. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d
721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.d 719, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973) (noting guest statute is
outdated as one reason not to apply it).
11. See generally, A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE AND
MULTINATIONAL PROBLEMS (temp. ed. 1983); A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW
OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965) (precursor to the 1983 temporary edition).
12. For outer space torts it will be important in the analysis to note any international
norms. Thus a treaty which only governs governmental activities might still create some ex-
pected normal rule and expectation for private activities in space. In addition the expectations
of the parties might be unique in space, affecting the choice of law analysis.
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creasingly moved toward a multi-aspect analysis, but a single aspect
analysis, focusing on use of a connecting factor such as the place of
injury, still has much support, and indeed is the norm in Europe.
Any international regime in the choice of law field must be able to
accommodate these theoretical strands. This background is crucial
for an understanding of choice of law for torts in outer space. Such
torts defy a simple analysis, even more so than earthbound torts, for
a number of reasons.
First, there is the general difficulty of making choice of law deci-
sions on an international, as opposed to domestic, level. The com-
plexities noted above, and the divergence between the United States
and European approaches, all cause problems. In addition, there are
international interests that must be accommodated, including foreign
policy concerns.
Second, and more important, torts in outer space pose a problem
in that there is no national territory where the activities in question
occur. Rather, they occur in space, making the place of injury rule,
which is the backbone of traditional tort analysis, of little help. This
problem exists even when activities occur inside a spaceship or other
space object. Is the object rightfully governed by the substantive law
of the launching State, of the State of registry (if that exists), or of a
number of States? There is no apparent answer.
A third problem is that space activity is uncommon and is likely
to remain so for quite some time. Accordingly, expectations of the
parties, and national interests during space travel, may be skewed.
Perhaps being on a space object carries with it some expectation, un-
like that on an airplane, that the law of the State of registry is the
governing law. Alternatively, perhaps each forum assumes use of its
own national law, since outer space issues often seem to indict for-
eign policy and national security concerns. The basic point is that
one cannot blindly translate traditional choice of law considerations
into outer space applications. Outer space by its very nature adds
unique factors which must be considered in formulating rules.
Noting that there are unique problems to torts in outer space
does not solve them. There have been numerous articles noting that
there is a problem of a lack of choice of law principles with regard to
activities in outer space. 13 These articles, however, merely pose the
13. Among the numerous works are M. FORKOSCH, OUTER SPACE AND LEGAL LIABIL-
ITY (1982); Bockstiegel, Legal Implications of Commercial Space Activities, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 24TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 1 (1982); Bockstiegel, Prospects of
Future Development in the Law of Outer Space, 8 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 305 (1983); De
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problem and show why current international law is inadequate. Aca-
demic attention has focused on the current state of the law and not
on what the law should or could be.
This Article tries to accomplish that objective, and to use cur-
rent choice of law concepts in an attempt to set up a regime for ana-
lyzing choice of law questions in outer space. The Article begins
with a brief analysis of the current legal framework for private activi-
ties in outer space. After examining the current law, or lack thereof,
the Article then sets forth proposed conflict of law rules. The analy-
sis is divided into three categories: intra-object torts (occurring
within one space object), inter-object torts (occurring between two
objects in outer space), and torts involving objects hitting the earth.
I. THE EXISTING TREATY FRAMEWORK
Any analysis of choice of law problems in outer space must be-
gin by looking at three international treaties, the Convention on In-
ternational Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability
Convention), 4 the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), i5 and the
Treaty on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Regis-
Saussure, An Integrated Legal System for Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 179, 186-87 (1978); De Saussure
and Haanappel, Determination of Applicable Law to Living and Working in Space, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE 25TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 223 (1983); Diederiks-Ver-
schoor, The Legal Status of the Space Shuttle, 1 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 197 (1976);
Diederiks-Verschoor & Gormley, The Future Legal Status of Nongovernmental Entities in
Outer Space. Private Individuals and Companies as Subjects and Beneficiaries of International
Space Law, 5 J. SPACE L. 125, 148 (1977) ("Left unresolved is the choice of law question.");
Gorove, The Space Shuttle: Some of Its Features and Legal Implications, 6 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 381 (1981); Hosenball, The Law Applicable to the Use of Space for Commercial Activi-
ties, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 143 (1984);
Menter, Commercial Participation in Space Activities, 9 J. SPACE L. 53 (1981); Rothblatt, Space
Law and Practice in the 1980's and Beyond: A Practitioner's Perspective, 12 J. SPACE L. 26
(1984); Sloup, Determination of Applicable Law to Living and Working in Outer Space: The
Municipal Law Connection and the NASA/Hastings Research Project, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
25TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 245 (1983).
14. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29,
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as Liability Con-
vention]. This Convention is in effect in all major countries involved in space activity, includ-
ing the United States, where the Convention entered into force on October 9, 1973.
15. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty]. This treaty was
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tration Treaty). 16 Each attempts to deal with some of the problems
in this area, but there are many questions left unanswered, and pri-
vate parties are left in essentially the same predicament for choice of
law purposes as they would have been without the treaties.
The Liability Convention ostensibly sets out the rules for dam-
age caused by space objects. The basic unit of analysis is the
"launching State," which is defined in Article I as "a State which
launches or procures the launching of a space object" or "a State
from whose territory or facility a space object is launched."' 7 Thus,
there can be two, or perhaps more, launching States for any space
object. Indeed, the Convention states that "[t]he term 'space object'
includes component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehi-
cle and parts thereof."'" This means that if a United States space
shuttle is launched in Canada, with a French component on board,
any of these States could be the launching State. This is especially
true because of the vagueness of the phrase "procures the
launching".
The Registration Treaty provides for the registration of all space
objects by the launching State, and defines launching State in lan-
guage identical to the Liability Convention. '9 Article 11(2) of the Re-
gistration Treaty provides that "[w]here there are two or more
launching States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly
determine which one of them shall register the object."' 20 This is of
some help, but the fact remains that, despite the registry, there is
nothing to prevent a non-registering State from being considered a
launching State for choice of law purposes, even if not for registra-
tion purposes.
This analysis is important due to Articles II and III of the Lia-
bility Convention, which impose liability on the launching State. Ar-
ticle II provides that:
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation
for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or
to aircraft in flight. 2'
16. Treaty on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter cited as Registration Treaty]. Again
this was signed by most industrial nations as well as the United States and Soviet Union. It
entered into force on September 15, 1976.
17. Liability Convention, supra note 14, at art. I.
18. Id.
19. Registration Treaty, supra note 16, at art. I.
20. Id. at art. 11(2).
21. Liability Convention, supra note 14, at art. I.
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Article III provides that:
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface
of the earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons
or property on board such a space object by a space object of an-
other launching State, the latter [State] shall be liable only if the
damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible.22
A number of problems remain. First, and most important, there
is no reason that this treaty should have any effect on suits between
private parties. Only nations are signatories to the treaty, the treaty
does not by its terms include private parties acting in their own inter-
ests, and no one has argued that the treaty was meant to include
private parties.
Second, the Treaty does not cover the problem of injury to na-
tionals of the launching State or to nationals of a foreign State while
aboard the launching State's space object.23 This considerably nar-
rows the scope of the Convention as regards personal injury, so that
it only applies to damage to nationals of other countries who are on
other space objects, an infrequent situation.
Third, even if the Treaty does apply, if a person on earth was,
for example, hit by Skylab while it was falling to earth, Article XI
provides that "[n]othing in this Convention shall prevent a State, or
natural or juridical persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim
in the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching
State."24 Thus, the Treaty can be bypassed in favor of the "tribu-
nals" of any of the launching States.
Fourth, Article III may not apply to any torts which occur
outside of a space object. Damage must be "to a space object ... or
to persons or property on board such a space object."25 What if in-
jury occurs during a space walk to repair a satellite, as recent space
shuttle astronauts have done? The Convention, strictly read, does
not apply in such a case since the injury occurred outside a space
22. Id. at art. III.
23. Id. at art. VII. This Article provides:
The provisons of this Convention shall not apply to damage caused by a space object
of a launching State to:
(a) Nationals of that launching State;
(b) Foreign nationals during such time as they are participating in the operation
of that space object from the time of its launching or at any stage thereafter until its
descent, or during such time as they are in the immediate vicinity of a planned
launching or recovery area as the result of an invitation by that launching State.
Id.
24. Id. at art. XI.
25. Id. at art. III.
Vol. 16
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object, not "on board."2 6
Indeed, a strict reading of Article III would also pose a fifth
limitation on the application of the Convention. It only applies when
damage is "by a space object of another launching State." This poses
at least two limitations. First, there could be a United States space-
ship, and property damage due to a defective part made in Mexico
(and Mexico has no other involvement with the space flight so is
probably not a launching State). Since damage was not from the
space object of a launching State, the treaty does not apply. Second,
there could be a Florida launched space object, with injury to prop-
erty resulting from a defective space object made in California. In
this case as well, Article III does not apply, as the launching country
and the nation that owns the object that does the damage are the
same. Disputes thus could arise over what type of liability, strict
liability or negligence, should be used.
These are severe limits on the usefulness of the Convention espe-
cially for private parties. Even to the extent that such parties might
try to present a compensation claim to a government, there are still
choice of law problems involved in assessing the amount of tort dam-
ages and any defenses to liability. As noted before, there may be
several launching States. There is no means to distinguish among
these States to decide whose law should apply for such issues.27 Arti-
cle XII provides that:
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay
for damage under this Convention shall be determined in accord-
ance with international law and the principles of justice and eq-
uity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the damage
as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or interna-
tional organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the
condition which would have existed if the damage had not
occurred.28
This provision fails to address a number of difficult questions, in par-
ticular the problem of defining "international law and the principles
of justice and equity" as regards world tort law. As one writer notes,
"[t]here does not ... exist a body of international law with precise
26. Gorove, Legal Aspects of International Space Flight, 3 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 409,
417 (1978); see also Reis, Some Reflection on the Liability Convention for Outer Space, 6 J.
SPACE L. 125, 127 (1978).
27. There is, however, a provision in Article V(l) that "[w]henever two or more States
jointly launch a space object, they shall be jointly and severally liable for any damage caused."
Liability Convention, supra note 14, at art. V.
28. Id. at art. XII.
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rules which give adequate guides by which to determine causation
and measure of damages."' 29  Another distinguished commentator
notes that "[i]nsofar as loss of consortium and the so-called 'moral
damage' is concerned, the success of the claim may depend on the
law of the state liable for damage in general."3
It is, needless to say, disturbing to find that the rules are vague
and give little guidance. Strict liability issues under Article II can
arise in various areas, including whether there should be survival of
actions after a person has died, whether there should be mental
anguish damages, how pain and suffering damages should be mea-
sured, whether collateral payment-for example from an insurance
company-should be subtracted from claimant's recovery, and
whether punitive damages should be allowable.3' For none of these
are any substantive or choice of law rules set forth. Article III negli-
gence actions present the same problems, along with further issues of
whether to apply a comparative negligence statute, what is the duty
of care, and how to define negligence.
The Outer Space Treaty fares little better under detailed analy-
sis. The Outer Space Treaty is a very general document. One advan-
tage it does possess in helping private parties guide their actions is its
provision that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by govern-
mental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring
that national activities are carried out in conformity with the pro-
visions set forth in the present Treaty.3 2
Thus the Treaty does govern action by private individuals, although
it is unclear what State would bear responsibility for a multinational
private party. This is, however, about the only useful part of the
Treaty for choice of law purposes. The central provision of the
Treaty states that:
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched
into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over
29. S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN OUTER
SPACE 46 (1968).
30. S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 125 (1977)
(this is perhaps the seminal work in the space law and choice of law field, although it is quite
short and merely poses problems in most cases, without giving answers.).
31. There is an excellent discussion of these issues in Alexander, Measuring Damages
Under the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 6 J.
SPACE L. 151 (1978).
32. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, at art. VI.
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such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space
or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer
space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body,
and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in
outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth.3 3
This provision avoids difficulties in defining the "launching State,"
since it instead relies on the State of registration. One difficulty, how-
ever, concerns the meaning of the words "jurisdiction and control."
One commentator, cited often on this topic, concludes that "[b]y pro-
viding that the registry State retains jurisdiction and control over its
objects and personnel while in outer space or on a celestial body, ame-
nability to legal process on return to earth is not within the bounds of
the treaty."3 4 Thus, the Treaty, under this interpretation, only regu-
lates physical control over the object while in space, and not legal
control over events which occur on the object once the persons in-
volved in those events are back on earth.3 5
Others argue to the contrary that jurisdiction exists even in the
legal sense.3 6 There are also those who argue that there could be
concurrent jurisdiction and control, by the launching State and by
the State of nationality of the astronaut.3 7
These problems, regarding what is "jurisdiction and control,"
and whether it applies on earth or merely in space, make the treaty
nondispositive for choice of law purposes. There seems to be some
preference, perhaps, in favor of the law of the registry State, but not a
clear one.
It should be noted, as a sidelight, that even if one were to uncon-
ditionally accept the law of the State of registry as definitive, certain
inequities and problems could result. Most important, the State of
33. Id. at art. VIII.
34. De Saussure, supra note 13, at 182. De Saussure discusses the hypothetical case of
American and French scientists on a joint space mission. The registry State can control physi-
cal movement of the ship, and activities on the ship, but has no control, in his view, once the
object returns to earth.
The use of the word "retains" is ambiguous, but seems to merely indicate continuity from
the time of the launch until the time of return to earth.
35. See also Bordunov, Rights of States as Regards Outer Space Objects, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 24TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 89, 90 (1982). "In practice control
consists in the activities of special services of the registration State aimed at monitoring the
technical condition of the space object during the launching and putting it into orbit, as well as
its functioning in outer space and during the landing." Id. This is Bordunov's definition of
"jurisdiction and control."
36. See, e.g., Gorove, supra note 26, at 415.
37. Dula, Regulation of Private Commercial Space Activities, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 25, 36 (1982).
291
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registry, as noted above, could be the launching State, the State that
"procures" the launch, or the State where the launching pad is lo-
cated. With the European Space Agency launching its spaceships
from remote locations in Africa, this could mean application of an
African State's law to a tort having no other connection to Africa. It
could also mean application of general European law, which could be
impossible to define. In addition, if a multinational private party is
involved, there would surely be argument over which State controls
that party and, therefore, over what law should be applicable.
Another article of the Outer Space Treaty should be mentioned.
Article VII is a tort liability provision. It is much more vague than
the Liability Convention, stating that:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory
or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for dam-
age to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridi-
cal persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in
air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies.38
Although there is no need to discuss it at length, the other major
outer space agreement is the Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty).39
The provisions are in essence identical to those of the Outer Space
Treaty, applying the same ideas to activities on the surface of the
moon or other celestial bodies. Article 14, like Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty, extends national jurisdiction to include activity
of private parties.4
Article 12 is similar to Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty,
in providing that "States Parties shall retain jurisdiction and control
over their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations
and installations on the moon."'" It need hardly be repeated, but
there are problems of defining jurisdiction and control. There is also,
38. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, at art. VII.
39. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979,
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1434 (1979). This Agreement has not entered into
force.
40. "States Parties to this Agreement shall bear international responsibility for national
activities on the moon, whether such activities are carried out by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conform-
ity with the provisions of this Agreement." Id. at art. 14.
41. Id. at art. 12.
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unlike the Outer Space Treaty, no clear provision regarding which
State retains that control. The reference in Article 12 is to "their
personnel, etc.," unlike the Article VIII reference to "the State of
registry." There is no liability provision similar to Article VIII of the
Outer Space Treaty.
The choice of law rules under the Liability Convention, the
Outer Space Treaty, the Registration Treaty, and the Moon Treaty
thus leave much to be desired. The Liability Convention has only
limited applicability and probably is of no relevance, except as back-
ground, for suits involving private parties. It should be remembered
in trying to formulate rules, however, that this Convention does
favor, in broad terms, strict liability when those injured are on earth,
and negligence liability when those injured are in outer space. The
Outer Space Treaty is of more relevance to private suits. Neverthe-
less, it is phrased in such broad terms as to be of little help on specific
questions of law. In particular the words "jurisdiction and control,"
while important in the Treaty, have no generally accepted meaning
beyond that they give physical control over the movements of a space
object, while in space, to the State of registry.
II. PREFERRED RULES IN TORT
In the absence of any treaty governing which State's law should
be applicable to torts in outer space, one must turn to general conflict
of laws principles. Although the United States has moved towards a
standard emphasizing which of its states has the most significant con-
tacts with the tort issue in question, the traditional tort rule, and that
in most European countries, focuses on use of a connecting factor to
the place of injury, the lex locus delicti.42 Such a traditional analysis
has been the backbone of all prior choice of law thinking regarding
outer space.
There is an assumption that for a space object the place of injury
is the space object and that the space object is under the control of
the State of registry. Therefore, the law to be applied is the law of the
State of registry of the vehicle. Thus it is said that "the jurisdiction
of the launching State over its space objects constitutes perhaps the
most undisputed [of] principles" in space law.43
42. See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text.
43. Fekete, Determination of Applicable Law to Living and Working in Outer Space, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 25TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 221 (1983). See also
Vereshchetin, International Space Law and Domestic Law: Problems of Interrelations, 9 J.
SPACE L. 31, 32-33 (1981) (expressing Soviet position in favor of this view). Even the leading
12
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This is too narrow an approach to the choice of law problem,
perhaps reflecting the fact that these writers are more familiar with
outer space law than with recent developments in conflict of laws
thinking. Those who do attempt to avoid the rigidity of a State of
registry rule have, however, advanced an equally formalistic rule of
always using the connecting factor of nationality, presumably the na-
tionality of the tort victim, to decide which law applies to determine
liability.
44
The problems with such rigid theories, in contrast to recent de-
velopments in the United States, can be seen by examining some hy-
pothetical situations. Applying the law of the State of registry would
seem unfair if there is an accident on the United States space shuttle,
but the accident is due to a defective Canadian product and the per-
son injured is Canadian. In that case, Canadian law should apply.
Similarly, it would also seem unfair to apply Soviet law if one French
astronaut struck and injured another French astronaut while both
were aboard a Soviet registered vessel.45
Other problems may arise if the State of registry or the national-
ity of the person injured are somewhat fortuitous. With European
Space Agency flights originating from remote sites in Africa, there is
no reason that the registry State could not be the African nation.
Indeed, if one were to apply a strict State of registry rule for torts,
then it might be in a space agency's best interest to use the launching
State as the State of registry if its liability rules are more beneficial to
defendants. The nationality of the victim can also be somewhat for-
tuitous, as for example when a space object strikes the earth injuring
a person or object on the ground. Since there is no control over
where the object will land, or at least very little control, it seems
absurd to let liability rest on whether the object lands in East Ger-
many or in West Germany. The only contact of the defendant with
that nation is the uncontrollable one of where the object has landed.
These hypotheticals point out that there is no simple rule that
writer in the field, Gorove, points to the State of registry. See, e.g., Gorove, Legal Aspects of the
Space Shuttle, 13 INT'L LAW. 153, 160 (1979). Gorove does, however, note that he might feel
differently if the tort was not "within the shuttle," but discusses the issue no further. Id.
44. See, e.g., De Saussure & Haanappel, A Unified Multinational Approach to the Applica-
tion of Tort and Contract Principles to Outer Space, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1 (1978).
This article is, however, better than most in recognizing that: "[fior outer space, there is no lex
loci delicti commissi. Thus, this venerable rule, so generously applied in both common and civil
law countries, is impossible to follow for space related torts (delicts)." Id. at 2. They also call
for a choice of law treaty in this field. Id. at 15.
45. The content of Soviet law in this area could also make such situations seem unfair,
thus exaggerating even more the difficulties of this approach.
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can be used for torts in outer space. Instead, it is necessary to do a
more detailed analysis of the situations involved, incorporating cur-
rent thinking in the choice of law field. Such an analysis would di-
vide the tort field into three different categories:
(1) intra-object torts-torts where all of the relevant events oc-
cur within a single space object, such as an astronaut harmed while
on board;
(2) inter-object torts-which involve an interaction of two ob-
jects which are in outer space, such as a collision of two satellites;
and
(3) objects hitting the earth-torts which involve a man-made
space object falling from outer space to the earth and injuring a per-
son or property on earth.
For each of these areas, a choice of law regime will be outlined
below.
A. Intra-Object Torts
The first group of cases concerns torts that occur solely within
one space object. For example, one astronaut negligently injures an-
other while on board a vehicle. This type of situation is similar to
torts which occur on earth. The space object, like a ship on the high
seas, can be seen as the lex locus delicti, and as an extension of the
territory of the State of registry, just as is done for vessels on the high
seas.
A first step in any choice of law analysis for intra-object torts is
to set a substantive floor of negligence liability. There should be a
general presumption that if defendants are negligent in outer space
they may be held liable. This is the basic rule expressed in the Liabil-
ity Convention, a rule which is intuitive and seems to have interna-
tional support. Of course, there could still be defenses to liability, or
limits on damages. The question thus turns from "will negligence
cause liability?" to "was there negligence?" or "are there any reasons
to deny liability despite a negligent act?" It is a subtle but important
shift in emphasis.46
46. Accepting a negligence regime avoids the problem with the current rules resulting
from the ability to forum shop by choosing the State of registry of the space object. If the
European Space Agency launches a private satellite from a remote nation which does not pro-
vide for liability, even for negligence, then a party could conveniently register in the name of
the launching State hoping that country's law will govern. This would be contrary to the
international expectations expressed in the Liability Convention that there is a norm of liability
when a party is negligent. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. Outer space activity
poses sufficient risk, and tort law has developed sufficiently on an international level, that a
14
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Almost all countries accept the basic premise of a negligence
regime but this does not tell what negligence rules to use. The next
step is to use a choice of law analysis to decide which State's law is
applicable for any individual intra-object tort issue. There are at
least three useful ways to handle this problem which do not apply a
rigid rule unresponsive to the circumstances of a particular case.
Each has its advantages and disadvantages. They are: (1) use an
interest analysis with no special factor for the tort occurring in space;
(2) use an interest analysis which gives predominant weight to expec-
tations of the parties that the State of registry's law governs; (3) use
the whole law of the State of registry, including use of renvoi.
The first approach is that advocated by Trautman and von Meh-
ren, an analysis which looks at the interest lying behind the tort law
at issue.4 7 The torts could be treated the same as those on earth,
merely setting the State of registry as the place of injury. Under this
analysis, for example, if the issue is whether to compensate a victim
for mental anguish, then the State with the closest connection to that
issue will presumably be the State of nationality or domicile of the
victim.48 If the issue concerns the liability of a private company for
acts of its agents in space, then the State with the closest connection
could be the State where the company is incorporated. The point is
that one should not use a blanket rule to decide which State's law
applies, a rule such as "it is always the State of registry." Different
issues may raise closer connections to different nations, and the State
of registry can be somewhat fortuitous.49
One important point which conterbalances this view is that be-
ing on a space object is not a normal activity. As a result there may
be an expectation among the parties that they are under the govern-
ance of the State of registry, and that normal tort rules may not al-
ways apply. There might validly be a presumption that the laws of
the State of registry govern since space travel is an extraordinary ac-
tivity and the parties have voluntarily submitted themselves to that
State's jurisdiction.
legal regime denying possible tort liability even for negligence cannot be deemed legitimate for
purposes of torts in outer space.
47. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
48. This is if, as would presumably be true in the United States, the policy behind the
statute or common law is to help the victims, not to get revenge on tortfeasors.
49. Even though this approach is appealing, it is unlikely that it will be accepted for the
same reasons people stressed using the law of the State of registry. In particular this approach,
as posited above, need not treat space torts as unique, but rather would cause an analysis which
merely treated the object as an extension of the territory of the State of registry.
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A functional analysis, as set forth above, is one way to take into
account multistate concerns, including the expectations of the par-
ties. Thus if one posits that there are strong expectations of the par-
ties in favor of the law of the State of registry, but does not make that
an unrebuttable rule, then an approach might be available to satisfy
most people's interests.
The second possibility is to use an interest analysis, but presume
that in most cases the expectations of the parties will favor use of the
State of registry. It would still be desirable to allow evidence that
another State has a closer connection to the issue in question and
thus its law should be applicable. For example, when the action is
between two nationals of a State other than the State of registry, the
former nation's law might well be applicable.
While in theory this approach is quite attractive, in practice it
may not work. The problem is that it may, if not administered skill-
fully, tend toward either an exclusive reliance on the State of registry
or else the same outcome as the functional analysis approach. The
former is too rigid and the latter is unlikely to garner international
support as a rule of law.
This leads to a third approach, which may be both practical and
acceptable to the nations of the world. This approach is suggested in
Richards v. United States,5" a decision addressing what law should be
applied under the Federal Tort Claims Act for an interstate tort.
The Court concluded that reference in the Tort Claims Act to the
law of a state should be taken to mean the whole law of that state,
including the choice of law rules. Thus the law to be applied would
be the law designated by the lex locus delicti. This case, then, al-
lowed use of renvoi in applying state law under the Act.
The advantage of this approach is that it takes into account the
interests of the State of registry without making that State's law gov-
ern per se. Thus, if the State of registry permits an interest analysis
to be performed, the courts will do so."' This approach combines the
traditional preference for a single-aspect connecting factor, the place
of registry, with the advantage of a device, renvoi, to help achieve
justice in individual cases.
50. 369 U.S. 1 (1961).
51. Recently there has been a tendency on the part of some States to depart from the
general conflicts rule in order to take into account the interests of the State having
significant contact with the parties to the litigation. We can see no compelling reason
to saddle the Act with an interpretation that would prevent the federal courts from
implementing this policy in choice-of-law rules where the State in which the negli-
gence occurred has adopted it.
Id. at 12-13.
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While renvoi is not the most popular choice of law tool, it could
be quite useful in satisfying international interests. It would be politi-
cally acceptable to most countries, as they would feel that, because of
reliance on the State of registry, they can maintain some control over
space objects. European countries, in particular, would probably not
welcome a pure interest analysis approach when they are still largely
using a traditional place of injury rule. There is also the advantage
that this approach provides greater predictability concerning which
State's law will apply in tort cases.
The disadvantage of this approach is that the State of registry
could still be chosen so as to minimize the possibility of future tort
liability. This, however, is avoided in part by providing, in step one
of this analysis, that there should be a norm of negligence liability.
Thus there would at least be some assurance that an international
standard of negligence would be upheld.
Overall, this third approach has problems, but may still be the
most politically acceptable approach that does not use a rigid rule.52
As more States may move towards an interest analysis for tort cases
this approach would also allow such a trend in the law to be reflected
in outer space cases. The unusual nature of space travel at present
gives some legitimacy to expectations that the law of the State of
registry will govern, but that expectation would lessen as travel
increases.53
Many have noted that parallels can be drawn between space law
and maritime and aviation law.54 The similarity is especially strong
in travel over the high seas, since the high seas, like outer space, are
subject to no State's sovereignty. Air travel over national territory
also is a useful analogy since there is the obvious similarity between
52. This author thinks it is important not to ignore political realities in this area. Any
uniform treaty, or common or civil law rules, regarding intra-object space torts will not be
adopted unless they address the concerns and intuitive preferences of the nations concerned.
Thus, while some might prefer an interest analysis, going issue by issue and looking at multi-
state concerns, this author wonders whether such a solution would be accepted by the Euro-
pean Space Agency. Using the whole law of the State of registry is something of a compromise,
between a rigid rule of lex locus delicti and a broad interest analysis, but it may be a feasible
alternative in a situation such as this where the place of injury is so easy to determine.
53. Indeed, a similar analysis could be used for travel over the high seas and in the air, so
that a balancing interest approach can be used, now that such activities are common. Such,
however, is not the current rule for maritime and aviation law.
54. See, e.g., De Saussure, Maritime and Space Law, Comparisons and Contrasts (An
Oceanic View of Space Transport), 9 J. SPACE L. 93 (1981); Kamentskaya, The Use of Compara-
tive Method in Determination ofApplicable Law to Living and Working in Space, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 25TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 229 (1983).
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an airplane and a space vehicle in terms of size, control by a State of
registry, and types of activities within the vehicle.
It is interesting, though probably not surprising, that both mari-
time and aviation laws have relied on the substantive law of the State
of registry. As noted in the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law, "[a] state may apply its law to activities, persons, or
things aboard a vessel or aircraft registered in the state."55
This idea is reflected in numerous conventions. In the maritime
field the Convention on the High Seas notes that "[s]hips shall sail
under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases ex-
pressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall
be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." 56 In general
"[w]ith respect to ships, the usual rule on personal injuries sustained
over the high seas would be that the law of the flag governs."57
Aviation law is similar. Of interest is the strong reliance on the
State of registry to govern criminal law on airplanes.58 Indeed the
State of registry's law has even been codified into United States law
for treatment of crime in space vehicles.59
Another interesting parallel, for intra-object torts in space, is the
international treatment of automobile accidents as seen in the Con-
55. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 comment f (1981).
56. Law of the Sea-Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
57. L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 2.12[2][a] (1980). Note that the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), and the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982), do
not mandate use of the law of the State of registry for, respectively, injuries in the course of
employment and death on a vessel on the high seas. The above text, however, notes the general
preference for the State of registry's law.
58. See, e.g., the "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" as defined in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (1982).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (1982) defines "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States" to include:
Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and on the registry of
the United States pursuant to the . . . [Outer Space Treaty and the Registration
Treaty] while that vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when all external
doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until the moment when one such
door is opened on Earth for disembarkation ....
Id. The legislative history indicates that the reliance is indeed on the State of registry, even
when that State has been chosen by agreement of the launching States pursuant to the Registra-
tion Treaty. H.R. Rep. No. 100, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1981). Note, however, that this
jurisdiction may not be applicable if the doors of the spacecraft are opened while in flight, as
the statute seems to rely upon doors being open or closed.
In addition it should be noted that there is a much stronger policy interest in a criminal
law to provide fair warning as to punishment. Thus, it is more justifiable to use a rigid rule of
the State of registry in the criminal area providing clear guidelines for individual conduct than
it would be in the area of torts. Due process concerns are more salient in the criminal field.
18
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vention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents.6' Car travel is
so common that the State of registration of the vehicle seems of little
importance. Thus the Convention states that "[t]he applicable law is
the internal law of the State where the accident occurred."'6 1 This is
useful precedent in arguing against State of registry rules.
It should be noted, however, that old ideas do not die easily.
Article 4 of the Convention provides that in some circumstances a
mechanical State of registry rule will apply, even for cars. Thus the
State of registry's law will be used where all the events are internal to
one vehicle, or if the colliding vehicles all have the same State of
registry.62
The point of this discussion is primarily to note that there is a
traditional preference for use of the law of the State of registry. This
preference may not be justified as such travel becomes more routine,
but it still seems to hold a strong psychological and intuitive appeal
for travel in the air or on the sea. As a result, a system where the
whole law of the State of registry is used should be more acceptable
than a regime that looks primarily to multistate factors. At any rate,
any of the three approaches outlined above would be preferable to
the current rigid rule of always using the substantive law of the State
of registry.
Under any of these approaches for intra-object torts one should
also deal with the possibility of stipulations by the parties. If the
parties stipulate who is to be liable for a tort, presumably through a
preexisting contract, then that stipulation should control.6 3 Such a
60. Concluded May 4, 1971 by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. This
is not in effect in the United States.
61. Id. at art. 3.
62. Id. at art. 4. It reads in pertinent part:
Subject to Article 5 [on exceptions for liability rules for damage to goods] the follow-
ing exceptions are made to the provision of Article 3-
a) Where only one vehicle is involved in the accident ... the internal law of the State
of registration is applicable to determine liability
-towards the driver, owner, or any other person having control of or an interest
in the vehicle ...
-towards a victim who is a passenger and whose habitual residence is in a State
other than that where the accident occurred,
-towards a victim who is outside the vehicle at the place of the accident and
whose habitual residence is in the State of registration ...
b) Where two or more vehicles are involved in the accident then provisions of a) are
applicable only if all the vehicles are registered in the same State.
c) Where one or more persons outside the vehicle or vehicles at the place of the
accident are involved in the accident and may be liable, then provisions of a) and b)
are applicable only if all these persons have their habitual residence in the State of
registration ....
63. Such stipulations would probably be least likely, though perhaps most helpful, in the
areas of inter-object torts and torts involving objects falling to earth. In both of those cases,
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stipulation allows the intent and expectations of the parties to gov-
ern. This is a valid multistate concern especially in outer space law
where the international regime of law is so much in doubt or in flux.
Indeed, barring treaties in this area, such contractual stipulations
may become increasingly common, whether in employment contracts
for astronauts or agreements between governments as to a docking in
space. 64
Intra-object torts are a unique class of torts in space law. These
torts most resemble those on earth and, were it not for the unusual
nature of space travel, would hardly seem worth this much analysis.
Many intra-object torts can be exceedingly common, with nothing
making them unique to space. Ultimately the problems in this area
of space law will be made easier to the extent that international
agreement can be reached on earthbound torts. If international rules
emerge for torts on earth, those same rules may well apply to activi-
ties inside one space object, using the object as the place of injury.
B. Inter-Object Torts
When torts involve two separate space objects a more difficult
question arises because there are fewer parallels which can be made
to earthbound torts. Inter-object torts may include the collision of
two satellites, the sabotage of another space object, or injuries while
docking two crafts together.
Most useful in this analysis may be a small handful of United
States cases dealing with collisions on or over the high seas.65 There
however, it would be difficult or impossible to predict in advance who could be a potential
adversary in a lawsuit, e.g., how to know who will be injured by a satellite when it falls to earth
in twenty years. By contrast, intra-object torts will usually involve harm to a predictable group
of people, the passengers or crew on a vessel, so contractual stipulations are much more
practicable.
64. This is not to say that stipulations have always been given a positive reception. In-
deed, under the traditional approach the tendency has been not to give effect to contractual
stipulations regarding tort liability. Courts have struck down such stipulations by strictly con-
struing contractual language, by saying the contract was an adhesion contract, by using public
policy arguments, and by other devices. For a useful opinion arguing against a contractual
stipulation for tort liability, see Judge Frank's dissent in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221
F.2d 189, 199 (1955). Siegelman itself is considered one of the more progressive opinions argu-
ing for recognizing stipulations as valid.
65. There are no other useful maritime or aviation law parallels for inter-object torts be-
yond these cases. The only other point to note is the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law, which focuses on application of national law of the United States if there are effects
in the United States or conduct in the United States. The effects test would be most important
here. In addition such jurisdiction, according to the Restatement, should not be exercised if it
is "unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 401-403
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are three ship collision cases decided in the United States,66 the most
famous of which is The Scotland, in which the Supreme Court held:
[I]f a collision occurs on the high seas, where the law of no partic-
ular State has exclusive force, but all equal, any forum called upon
to settle the rights of the parties, would prima facie, determine
them by its own law as presumptively expressing the rules of jus-
tice; but if the contesting vessels belonged to the same foreign na-
tion, the court would assume that they were subject to the law of
their Nation carried under their common flag, and would deter-
mine the controversy accordingly.
67
Two later cases have further refined this point, stating that the "rules
of justice" are in fact "general maritime law as interpreted by the
courts of the forum."
68
This approach seems attractive for inter-object torts in space.
The reference to general maritime law invites an international stan-
dard, most logically a rule of justice giving compensation in ordinary
cases. As a first step in the analysis, however, if both ships are of the
same registry then that nation's substantive law should apply. This
result merely reflects a "most significant contacts" test, since the
State with the closest connection to the transaction is the country of
registry. In most cases that State would have a fundamental interest
in regulating liability in a collision between two of its ships.6 9
Beyond this situation resort to international law, or what The
Scotland calls "rules of justice," seems the only logical alternative.
The first and most important point is that, unlike torts occurring
within one space object, these torts truly occur in outer space. There
is no lex locus delicti subject to a specific State's national jurisdiction
since space is not under national jurisdiction. Because there are vari-
(1981). Ostensibly this analysis would similarly apply to American inter-object torts in outer
space. These sections, however, are so vague as to be of little use.
66. No cases of airplane collisions over the high seas seem to exist. KREINDLER, supra
note 57, at § 2.12[3].
67. The "Scotland," 105 U.S. 24, 29-30 (1881).
68. Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc. 521 F.2d 448, 452 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1052 (1976); Alkmeon Naviera v. M/V "Marina L.," 633 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1980).
69. There is a solid presumption, so long as the State of registry is not merely a registry of
convenience to serve, for example, tax purposes, without any real connection to the ship, that
the State of registry would have a fundamental interest. If the registration is in fact merely for
convenience then one should not use the State of registry's law. Barring such a situation,
however, the State of registry would seem to have the strongest interest in the inter-object event
itself and in liability for that event (note this says nothing about interactions within the space
object). There is indeed a tradition in maritime law that the crew of a vessel takes on the
nationality of the ship. See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). This may be dubious, as
argued before, for intra-object events, but has value when focusing on collisons between two
vessels, where the ships themselves have real connection to the nation in question.
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ous parties and interests involved no single place of injury exists and
the lex locus delicti rule simply cannot be applied.
Instead some broader international concerns should be used.
Although an issue-by-issue functional analysis might be attractive it
would not be useful for inter-object torts. This is because any broad
interest analysis approach, without use of multistate concerns, would
give little guidance on many issues.7° Comparing the national laws
of the plaintiff, the defendant, and any other concerned jurisdictions
does not seem relevant due to the international nature of these torts.
To the extent there are any expectations of applicable law, they
would undoubtedly favor the use of international law and not na-
tional law, since space is not subject to national claims of sovereignty.
It is truly appropriate then to assert that multistate rules should
take one of two forms. The first form would be a set of international
"rules of the road," setting up internationl law to govern the move-
ment of objects in space. This would be analogous to the Convention
on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea7'
and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.72
These conventions set forth rules of the road to be followed on the
high seas and safety guidelines for ships. The provisons are quite
detailed, but are strictly descriptive and contain no tort liability pro-
visions or remedies for violations. These conventions nevertheless
provide a preliminary framework within which to judge tort liability.
The reality is that it is unlikely such a set of rules would develop
in outer space law for quite a long time. Even if it were to develop
there would be many outstanding issues, such as amount and types of
damages and when to use negligence or strict liability rules. Thus, it
would be useful to determine an approach for handling inter-object
tort issues which could be of practical use to solve these problems.
As a result, the second approach is a true functional analysis
using multistate and international policy interests. What are those
international interests, those "rules of justice?" Because inter-object
torts are unusual and dangerous compared even to intra-object torts,
70. For example when two private satellites collide, how will a court decide whether to
use California's comparative negligence law or Maryland's contributory negligence rules? Any
decision of this question based on analysis of the two state statutes must involve what is an
artificial analysis for torts in pure outer space. Neither party could anticipate, nor have submit-
ted in any way, to jurisdiction by the other location.
71. Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. No. 8587.
72. Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 49, T.I.A.S. No. 9700, modified by Protocol of 1978 Relating
to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, Feb. 17, 1978, T.I.A.S. No.
10009. This is in effect in the United States as of May 1, 1981.
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the overriding interest should be to protect the victims of such
torts.73 In addition, compensating victims is a basic function of tort
law. These primary international policy concerns could not be satis-
fied by looking merely at national interests regarding a specific tort
issue.
As a result a basic rule of compensation for injury should be
used unless such a rule contravenes a fundamental policy of the State
with the closest connection to the issue in question. There is a simi-
larity here to a rule for intra-object torts, that the expectations of the
parties generally point to the State of registry. In this area, multi-
state concerns point to use of the law that will give compensation to
victims.
This preference for victim compensation can be seen in existing
agreements such as the Convention on the Law Applicable to Prod-
ucts Liability (Products Liability Convention).74 This Convention
begins with a rule that the place of injury controls, but then adds
numerous qualifications.7" The result is that plaintiffs are allowed to
choose the law they wish, depending on which State might give the
best compensation.
This illustrates that a basic policy of compensation is not neces-
sarily a radical and untried device. The rule also need not be a
mechanical one. The interests of the concerned States should still be
a factor. If a fundamental policy of a nation with the closest connec-
tion to the issue is violated, then that nation's laws should be applied
in lieu of a policy of compensation.76 A fundamental policy interest
would have to be a strongly held, basic tenet of the law in that nation.
73. There is an international interest in protecting plaintiffs in this field, but the protection
need not extend to strict liability. Plaintiffs, by virtue of the nature of these torts, have been
engaged in space activity and are thus aware of the risks, and can share that risk.
74. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Law Applicable
to Products Liability, Adopted Oct. 2, 1972, reprinted in II INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1283
(1972); for discussion of this Convention and of international products liability see Matte,
Product Liability of the Manufacturer of Space Objects, 2 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 375 (1977);
Reese, Products Liability and Choice of Law: The United States Proposal to the Hague Confer-
ence, 25 VANDERBILT L. REV. 29 (1972).
75. For example, article 6 states:
Where neither of the laws designated in Articles 4 and 5 applies, the applicable law
shall be the internal law of the State of the principal place of business of the person
claimed to be liable, unless the claimant bases his claim upon the internal law for the
State of the place of injury.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, supra note 74, at art. 6.
76. The trick is to define a fundamental policy, and also to see which State has the closest
connection to a particular issue. If the issue is punitive damages, then the nation with the
closest connection to the issue would be the State of nationality of the defendant (assuming the
policy behind punitive damages is to punish the tortfeasor).
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For example, some strong expression of legislative or judicial intent
might be adequate. A fundamental interest would not include a de-
nial of such damages because the damages were too low, or because
the victim is from another State.
Inter-object torts in space could become a more important issue
over time, as activities in space expand beyond the confines of an
individual vehicle. Space walks, space stations, and exploration of
planets all pose inter-object situations where there is no place of in-
jury under national sovereignty. In addition, the possibility of litiga-
tion over collision of private satellites will increase as more satellites
are placed in orbit, and as private individuals have greater access to
such launchings through the space shuttle or European Space
Agency flights.
C. Objects Hitting the Earth
The third class of cases is the most unusual, though it too may
increase as activities in space increase. This is the problem of objects
falling from space to earth and injuring persons or property on the
ground.
There are a number of factors unique to this area that suggest a
substantive rule which holds the person in whose name the object is
registered liable for the tort." First, the injured party on the ground
has not been engaged in space activity. Thus there are no assumed
risks by those injured as there might be for torts which occur in outer
space. Second, making the owners of the space object liable for the
injury helps in spreading the loss. The losses in tort cases involving
77. Defining who is responsible for a space object that falls to earth, when the object
involves private commercial activity, is a difficult task. Related issues may also arise in some
inter-object torts, such as the collision of two objects in space. Those responsible will be re-
ferred to as the "owners" of the object. Those responsible could be the manufacturer of the
object, the group that procures the launch of the object, or the group that is responsible for the
specific part that falls to earth and causes injury. In most cases the group procuring the launch
should be responsible, since the manufacturer may not be relevant (especially if the object falls
to earth not due to any fault of the manufacturer, but merely because, over time, objects lose
their orbit), and to determine where each specific piece of an object was made will be difficult or
impossible. Overall, however, this question may need to be decided on a case by case basis.
Some relevant information for determining who is liable might be gleaned from the regis-
try of the space object which is furnished to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under
the Registration Treaty. All objects launched into space are registered. The information regis-
tered is at present quite sparse, but includes the name of launching State, registration number,
launch information, orbital information, and the general function of the object. Registration
Treaty, supra note 16, at art. IV. It could be useful to add a provision to the treaty requiring
further information if the object is launched for a private party. The Registration Treaty then
provides for supplying registration information in the event of tort damage. Id. at art. VI.
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objects falling to earth could be great, greater even than for other
outer space torts. With potential damages being so great, it is best to
spread the loss as much as possible.7" A third factor is the hazardous
nature of this tort. Any object falling to earth poses a severe threat,
and while such threats often go unrealized, there is little one can do
in defense. Although the doctrine of ultrahazardous activity79 may
not be strictly applicable to an object falling from space, it does sug-
gest reasons why one might want to hold those responsible for the
space object liable.80
The best solution for this class of cases would be to use a normal
rule of strict liability. This is the best choice of law rule since for
these torts international concerns for compensation of victims
predominate. It also avoids costly litigation, in which evidence may
be difficult to obtain, to determine negligence liability.8 '
A strict liability rule also is consistent with the expectations of
nations regarding when they are liable for falling space objects. The
Liability Convention itself expresses a preference for a rule of strict
liability for objects hitting the earth 2 and, therefore, a strict liability
rule may already have some force in international law. The existence
of this rule could make a strict liability rule for private parties more
palatable.
Political realities would discourage the application of national
law because negligence laws could vary, even over a short geographic
distance. The primary national interest would be to get compensa-
tion for victims, not just to have national law applied regardless of
the results. For issues that may not adequately be treated even by
specifying a strict liability regime, issues such as recovery for loss of
78. This is more likely if the owner of the object is held liable, since the owner will un-
doubtedly be a corporation or group of individuals. The injured party, by contrast, could often
be one individual, with fewer resources available and less ability to absorb the loss. In addition,
it is more likely that those involved in launching the space object have insurance to cover such
injuries than those who were injured. This further spreads the loss.
79. The doctrine of "ultrahazardous" or "abnormally dangerous" activity is outlined in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1981).
80. This analysis parallels that of Cavers in an interesting work on why there should be
strict liability for nuclear power plant accidents. The argumentation and analysis provide use-
ful guides for why there might be strict liability for space objects hitting earth. Cavers, Improv-
ing Financial Protection of the Public Against the Hazards of Nuclear Power, 77 HARV. L. REV.
644, 651-54 (1964).
81. See id. at 664-72 for Cavers' extended version of these arguments for nuclear power
plant accidents.
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consortium, a regime similar to that suggested for inter-object torts
could be helpful.
One interesting area worth comparing to this unique class of
torts is the field of criminal law. A number of crimes are considered
to be universal crimes and punished no matter where the case is tried
or what the nationality of the defendant or victims.8 3 Just as such
universal crimes set up a normal rule, so a regime of strict liability
sets up a normal rule. Such standards seem most appropriate when
there is an important State interest, rather than when interests are
more individual or unique to the case. In criminal law the need for
fair warning, and State interests in retribution, loom large. In the
area of objects hitting the earth from space there may also be strong
State interests, in compensating for injury to persons or property.
Overall, a rule of strict liability for objects hitting the earth
seems to satisfy most interests, and also seems politically acceptable.
Unlike intra-object and inter-object torts, torts involving objects hit-
ting the earth pose such unique problems that a substantive rule, and
not a choice of law rule, seems most appropriate. More accurately,
choice of law considerations implicate international concerns, and
concern for compensation of victims appears paramount in this area.
The torts are dangerous, the injured parties have assumed none of the
risks of space activity, and the owners of the objects can better spread
the loss. All of these considerations support a general rule of
compensation.
III. OTHER CONCERNS
Crewmembers v. Passengers-Should the crew of a space vehicle
be treated differently, for choice of law purposes, than passengers? In
83. Universal crimes have become accepted in the areas of sabotage of aircraft, hijacking
of aircraft, and piracy, to cite prominent examples. There is also discussion that universal
crimes may include transportation of women or children for illicit purposes, counterfeiting, and
slavery. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105. Piracy is perhaps the oldest of universal crimes. See,
e.g., Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 56, at arts. 100, 101; RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 404, 522 comment b (1981).
An excellent summary discussion concerning universal crimes is provided in RESTATE-
MENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1981). Also of interest on universal
crimes is the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, reprinted in 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) (articles 8, 9 and 10 are most relevant); see also Gorove, Criminal
Jurisdiction in Outer Space, 6 INT'L LAW. 313 (1972) (parallel analysis to that in the Draft
Convention).
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the absence of a stipulation, which might be honored as noted previ-
ously, it seems that there should be no difference. The major distinc-
tion between passengers and crew might be that the crew has
assumed the risk of space flight. This argument, however, fails in
practice. To the extent space travel is rare, the passengers too are
aware of the risk. To the extent that such travel becomes common,
no one feels there is a great risk. Thus in practical terms the risk
assumption seems equal. In addition, it would be difficult to get in-
ternational acceptance of a regime treating passengers and crew dif-
ferently. There is, after all, no differing treatment, for choice of law
purposes, on ships or airplanes. Granted there are statutes for injury
in the course of employment, and no problem exists with similar stat-
utes in the field of space travel, but barring such statutes tort injuries
are treated alike for choice of law purposes, even if they are not
treated alike for substantive law purposes.
84
Federal v. State Law in the United States-This article has
treated each state of the United States as a separate legal entity, on a
par for choice of law purposes with a foreign country. This is appro-
priate in most circumstances. The tort activities involved are largely
dependent upon a particular state, whether it is determined by the
differing domiciles of the parties, the place a product was designed or
manufactured, or the location of the principle place of business of the
company whose satellite has been in a collision. Such contacts seem
to be, in fact, state bound.
At the same time, there is a great deal of logic behind moving to
a federal common law or statutory scheme, for choice of law in this
field. In intra-object torts, there is a State of registry which shifts the
analysis to the level of nations. The object is not registered in the
name of a state, it is in the name of the United States. Thus if United
States law is found to apply it seems more appropriate to use federal
law, at least in those intra-object cases where United States law is
84. At the same time there are interesting issues of whether the substantive law should be
the same for crew as for passengers, even if the choice of law analysis is the same. Statutes such
as the Jones Act in maritime law, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), do in fact distinguish passengers
from crew for substantive law purposes. Seamen may also have remedies for an unseaworthy
vessel that passengers would lack. See De Saussure, Astronauts and Seamen-A Legal Compar-
ison, 10 J. SPACE L. 165, 173-75 (1982). In addition there is an argument that the Outer Space
Treaty is explicitly intended to differentiate passengers from crew when it refers only to "juris-
diction and control over.., any personnel thereof." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, at art.
VIII; GOROVE, supra note 30, at 98, 147. One author notes these arguments about article VIII
but concludes that "[i]ntemational space law provides the same status to all persons on board a
space object." Vereshchetin, Legal Status of International Space Crews, 3 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 545, 550 (1978).
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applied because of the fact that the United States is the State of regis-
try (the place of injury). If United States law is applied merely be-
cause all of the parties are from this country then the argument for
federal law loses much of its force.
Similarly, for inter-object torts, if the interests involved in
choosing the fundamental policy interest are federal, not state ori-
ented, then one should use federal law. The approach should be to
analyze issue by issue to see if any state, or the federal system, has a
strong interest. An example where state interests could be important
is in looking at the state of domicile of an injured victim, perhaps for
a loss of consortium claim. The same analysis applies to torts result-
ing from objects hitting the earth.
Thus federal common law seems most useful for intra-object
torts, ironically the area where traditional tort rules might have the
most force. Development of a federal common law or statutory
scheme would probably meet with resistance. It is worth noting that
federal common law does exist in some areas already, including, for a
useful analogy, in the maritime field. The parallel is a powerful argu-
ment for federal uniformity in the area of space law.
In spite of the development of the state versus federal issue, the
analysis in this Article remains the same. The issue of federal versus
state law is one of how to specify choice of law, not whether to spec-
ify it at all.
CONCLUSION
As private activities in outer space become more common, it will
become essential to develop choice of law rules to govern that activ-
ity. One area which is of particular concern and difficulty is that of
tort claims. This Article has set out a framework for analyzing this
field.
In the area of torts, the Liability Convention focuses on the law
of the "launching State," while the Outer Space Treaty focuses on
the law of the State of registry of the space vehicle. Neither of these
treaties applies to suits between private parties, and, even if they were
applicable, they leave many issues of liability unanswered.
For example, the Outer Space Treaty rests "jurisdiction and
control" of the space object in the State of registry, but it is unclear
what this means in practice. Even if this were clear, a choice of law
rule focusing exclusively on the State of registry, even when all in-
volved parties have no connection to that State or when the tort oc-
curs outside a space vehicle, seems too narrow and formalistic.
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As a result it seems useful to attempt to form a new framework
for analysis, and to go beyond simply acknowledging a problem in
this field. In the area of torts, choice of law rules would seem to be
best divided into three areas-intra-object torts, inter-object torts,
and objects hitting the earth. In the first situation, where all of the
relevant events occur within a single space object, the preferred ap-
proach seems fairly simple. The space object should be treated as the
lex locus delicti, and treat that location as though it were an exten-
sion of the territory of the State of registry. This should not lead to a
mechanical application of the State of registry's law, rather it should
merely be the starting point for analysis. It could be the starting
point for an issue analysis as is done for tort problems in some
United States jurisdictions, or, more practically, it could be the start-
ing point for an approach using renvoi to look at the whole law of the
State of registry.
Inter-object torts are more difficult. These include situations
such as the collision of two satellites, or sabotage of another space
object. Here there is no place of wrong under a State's sovereignty.
While it might be desirable to have "rules of the road" so that inter-
national law could govern such torts, the development of such law
seems unlikely in the near future, and would probably not cover all
tort issues. As a result, it seems best to look at broader policy inter-
ests, and conclude that there should be a basic rule of compensation
for injury, unless such a rule contravenes a fundamental policy of the
State with the closest connection to the issue in question. Such an
approach is suggested by maritime cases involving collisions on the
high seas, as well as by the Products Liability Convention in its
favoring of plaintiff's choice of law.
The third situation concerns objects hitting the earth and caus-
ing damage on earth. Here it seems best to follow the guidance of the
Liability Convention and use a rule of strict liability for damage
(again a basic rule of compensation). This is especially justified by
the fact that such torts are unusual, and unusually dangerous. In
addition, the parties injured by objects hitting the earth have, in con-
trast to those who originally launched the objects, assumed none of
the risks of space activity voluntarily.
Choice of law rules in this field are needed, and such rules
should reflect the best of current choice of law analysis, not a primi-
tive reliance on the law of the forum or the place of wrong. Such
formalistic rules, suggested by most of the current treaties and litera-
ture in this area, will be and should be rejected by the courts. The
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rules suggested in this Article do not attempt to treat all torts alike.
There seem to be, in particular, important differences depending on
where the torts occur. Further analysis will be needed, especially as
new problems arise, but these rules can serve as a preliminary focus
for deciding which State's law applies to private disputes regarding
activities in outer space.
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